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 “We have freedom of speech, but you got to watch what you say.”1 Depending on 
the parties, content, and context, only some forms of speech are protected under the 
First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.2 For instance, individuals are not entitled 
to speech that presents a clear and present danger to society.3 The First Amendment 
protects a private individual’s freedom of speech only when state action attempts to 
suppress it—not private actors or institutions.4 But what happens to freedom of 
speech when both parties are state actors? This Case Comment explores this intricate 
and complex area of First Amendment rights.
 In 2017, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had to determine whether the speech 
of public employees Matthew Gillis and Fred Walraven was protected under the First 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.5 The court applied the Pickering balancing test6 
and was faced with a matter of first impression—whether an employer, in order to 
prevail under the test, must present evidence illustrating that the employee’s speech 
caused an actual disruption in the workplace.7 This Case Comment contends that the 
Gillis court erred in its application of the Pickering balancing test because it failed to 
adhere to the doctrines of vertical and horizontal stare decisis.8 First, the court erred 
by not addressing the threshold question of public concern before applying the 
Pickering balancing test. The court should have first determined whether the 
employees’ speech was a matter of public concern9 and if so, then applied the Pickering 
1. Dave Itzkoff, Tracy Morgan: ‘You Got to Watch What You Say’, N.Y. Times (Apr. 15, 2014), https://www.
nytimes.com/2014/04/20/magazine/tracy-morgan-you-got-to-watch-what-you-say.html.
2. See Michael Gonchar, Why Is Freedom of Speech an Important Right? When, if Ever, Can It Be Limited, N.Y. 
Times (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/12/learning/why-is-freedom-of-speech-an-
important-right-when-if-ever-can-it-be-limited.html (discussing the First Amendment and how “there 
are complex lines that can be drawn around what kinds of speech are protected and in what setting”).
3. Id. See also Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“The question in every case is whether the 
words used are used in such circumstances and are of such nature as to create a clear and present danger 
that they will bring about the substantive perils that Congress has a right to prevent.”). 
4. See Elizabeth A. Riley, Note, Waters v. Churchill: The Procedural Due Process Disguise of Public Employee 
Free Speech Rights, 24 Cap. U. L. Rev. 893, 893 (1995). 
5. Gillis v. Miller, 845 F.3d 677, 680–81 (6th Cir. 2017).
6. The Pickering balancing test requires the court to “arrive at a balance between the interests of the 
[employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as 
an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” 
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
7. Gillis, 845 F.3d at 685 (“In fact, it appears that we have never squarely addressed whether employers 
must show evidence of actual disruption in order to prevail under the Pickering test.”). 
8. Vertical stare decisis is defined as “the doctrine of precedent, under which a court must follow earlier 
judicial decisions when the same points arise again in litigation.” Vertical stare decisis, Black’s Law 
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Horizontal stare decisis is defined as “the doctrine that a court, esp. an 
appellate court, must adhere to its own prior decisions, unless it finds compelling reasons to overrule 
itself.” Horizontal stare decisis, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
9. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987) (stating that “[t]he threshold question in applying 
[the Pickering balancing] test is whether [the employee’s] speech may be ‘fairly characterized as 
constituting speech on a matter of public concern’”); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146–47 (1983) 
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balancing test that calls for balancing the interests of the employee and employer.10 
Second, the court incorrectly applied the precedent set out in Waters v. Churchill by 
failing to recognize that the material facts in Waters are distinguishable from those in 
Gillis. These two errors resulted in the Gillis court holding that in order for employers 
to prevail under the Pickering balancing test, they need not present actual evidence of 
disruption in the workplace resulting from the employees’ speech.11
 Matthew Gillis was already on the staff at the Bay County Jail in Bay City, 
Michigan, as a Correctional Facility Officer (CFO) when, in January 2014, he was 
elected to serve as the president of the Bay County Corrections Officer’s Union.12 
Fred Walraven worked alongside Gillis at the Bay County Jail as a CFO and 
Sergeant.13 In early 2014, Sheriff John Miller of the Bay County Sheriff ’s Department 
began an investigation into potential prescription drug trafficking within the jail 
after learning that one of his deputies had supplied an inmate with prescription 
mouthwash for periodontal disease.14
 During the investigation, Gillis received numerous complaints from jail staff 
concerning the conduct of Bay County Jail’s management.15 In response, Gillis and 
Walraven wrote a memorandum informing the jail staff of their union rights as 
outlined in National Labor Relations Board v. J. Weingarten Inc.16 On February 12, 
(outlining that because the employee’s speech did not constitute a matter of public concern, the Court 
did not need to balance the interests between the employee and employer); Farhat v. Jopke, 370 F.3d 
580, 588–89 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 143; Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568–88). See also 
Whitney v. City of Milan, 677 F.3d 292, 298 (6th Cir. 2012). The court stated:
First, we determine whether the affected speech involved a public employee’s comments 
as a private citizen on a matter of public concern. Second, if the speech involves a 
matter of public concern, then we must balance the interests of the public employee, ‘as 
a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, 
as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through 
its employees.’
 Id.
10. See Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388; Connick, 461 U.S. at 146–47; Whitney, 677 F.3d at 298; Farhat, 370 F.3d at 
588–89.
11. Gillis, 845 F.3d at 687 (“We therefore join those courts and the Waters plurality and hold that a public 
employer need not show actual disruption of the public agency in all cases in order to prevail under the 
Pickering balancing test.”). 
12. Gillis v. Miller, No. 14-cv-12518, 2016 WL 337454, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 28, 2016) aff ’d, 845 F.3d 
677 (6th Cir. 2017). Gillis continued to carry out his CFO duties when he was elected to serve as 
president of the Bay County Corrections Officer’s Union. Id. 
13. Gillis, 845 F.3d at 681.
14. Id.
15. Id. During the investigation, while management was trying to collect information from employees 
about the alleged trafficking, several employees complained about being interrogated or even threatened 
by management. Id.
16. Id. at 681 (citing Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266–68 (1975) (holding 
that unionized employees have a right, under the National Labor Relations Act, to have a union 
representative present during meetings with management that they reasonably believe will result in 
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2014, Gillis and Walraven posted this memorandum on an employee bulletin board 
inside the jail.17
 On February 13, 2014, Miller summoned Gillis to the undersheriff ’s18 office.19 
Upon Gillis entering the office, Miller tossed the memorandum across the table and 
demanded to know who wrote it, stating: “I will have you know I can have you 
prosecuted for interfering with an ongoing investigation for posting this memo.”20 
Subsequently, on February 26, 2014, an investigation into Gillis’ conduct commenced 
after a former inmate alleged that she had engaged in a sexual relationship with 
Gillis while in custody and during her court supervised release.21 When confronted 
with these allegations one day later, Gillis initially denied the inmate’s allegations, 
but ultimately admitted to them and resigned from his position as a CFO at Bay 
County Jail.22
 On February 18, 2014, Walraven was placed on administrative leave following an 
investigation concerning alleged misconduct.23 The investigation stemmed from an 
anonymous note passed to the undersheriff in January 2014 suggesting that 
management review security camera footage from shifts when Walraven had acted as 
supervisor.24 A review of the footage revealed that the corrections officers under 
Walraven’s supervision had engaged in various policy violating activities such as 
damaging jail property, conducting outside business while inside the jail, and 
permitting the use of cell phones inside the jail.25 Walraven’s employment was 
terminated on April 15, 2014.26
 Plaintiffs Gillis and Walraven brought separate suits against Defendants Miller 
and the Bay County Sheriff ’s Department in the United States District Court for 
disciplinary action)). Gillis and Walraven’s memorandum outlined the rights of the prison employees 
and instructed them: 
When you are summoned before a superior officer, I strongly suggest you state these 
words before you say anything else. ‘If this discussion could in any way lead to me being 
disciplined or discharged, I request that my Union representative be present at the 
meeting. Without representation, I choose not to answer any questions.’ 
 Gillis, 845 F.3d at 682.
17. Id. at 681–82.
18. According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, the term “undersheriff ” means “a sheriff ’s deputy.” 
Undersheriff, Merriam–Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/undersheriff (last 
visited Nov. 13, 2018).
19. Gillis, 845 F.3d at 682.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 682–83. 
22. Gillis v. Miller, No. 14-cv-12518, 2016 WL 337454, at *4 –6 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 28, 2016).
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the Eastern District of Michigan.27 Both Gillis and Walraven asserted claims under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing they were discharged in retaliation for posting the 
memorandum, in violation of their First Amendment rights.28 On January 28, 2016, 
the District Court granted the Defendants’ summary judgment motion29 in both 
cases, holding that the memorandum was not protected speech under the First 
Amendment.30 The court reasoned that the memorandum did not touch on matters 
of public concern and even if it had, the Defendants’ investigatory interests 
outweighed the Plaintiffs’ speech interests.31 Gillis and Walraven filed appeals to the 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals on the grounds that the district court erred in 
granting the Defendants’ summary judgment motion.32 The court combined the 
appeals and issued a decision on January 6, 2017.33
 The first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution, known as the Bill of Rights, 
protect the individual liberties of Americans.34 The first of these ten amendments 
protects an individual’s right to freedom of speech.35 The Framers’ desire to expand 
27. Id. at 683.
28. Id. See also 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 (West 1996). 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of 
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an 
act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be 
granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For 
the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of 
Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
 Id.
29. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. 
A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or the 
part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought. The court shall 
grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court 
should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the motion.
 Id.
30. Gillis, 845 F.3d at 683. Protected speech is speech that cannot be restricted by the government under the 
First Amendment of the Constitution. See Michael Kahn, The Origination and Early Development of Free 
Speech in the United States, 76 Fla. B.J. 71, 71 (2002).
31. Gillis, 845 F.3d at 683.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 681–83.
34. Bill of Rights Inst., https://billofrightsinstitute.org/founding-documents/bill-of-rights/ (last visited 
Nov. 7, 2018). 
35. U.S. Const. amend. I. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the right of 
the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” Id.
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and protect this right stemmed from the longstanding suppression of speech 
throughout English history.36 However, freedom of speech is not always guaranteed—
it can only be protected when government action is taken against a private individual 
to suppress this right.37
 Viewing First Amendment rights through the prism of employment related 
speech, it is understood that private employers cannot be found liable for violating 
the Constitution for terminating private employees38 who engage in speech 
concerning the policies, practices, or operations of that employer.39 For decades, 
public and private employees40 were treated the same under the First Amendment, 
and it was understood that when a public employee is hired, she relinquishes certain 
constitutional rights.41 It was not until 1967 that the Supreme Court addressed First 
Amendment speech rights of public employees by rejecting the premise that “public 
employment . . . may be conditioned upon the surrender of constitutional rights 
which could not be abridged by direct government action.”42
 In 1968, the Supreme Court passed down its landmark decision in the arena of 
public employee free speech.43 In Pickering v. Board of Education, a teacher was 
dismissed from his position for sending a letter to the local newspaper, in connection 
to a recently proposed tax increase, criticizing the superintendent and Board of 
Education’s past proposals to raise new revenue for schools.44 The Court held that 
36. See generally Kahn, supra note 30, at 71–73 (explaining how the early origins of speech suppression in 
English history inf luenced the Framers of the Constitution).
37. See Riley, supra note 4, at 893.
38. Id. Private employees are individuals who work for a private employer (any employer that is not the 
federal, state, or local government). Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. Public employees are individuals who work for federal, state, or local governments. Id.
41. Id. (citing McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 520 (Mass. 1892)). Relinquishment of 
certain constitutional rights when public employees are hired is further outlined in Keyishian v. Bd. of 
Regents of Univ. of N.Y.: 
[A teacher] ‘may work for the school system upon the reasonable terms laid down by the 
proper authorities of [the state]. If they do not choose to work on such terms, they are at 
liberty to retain their beliefs and go elsewhere.’ Further, a teacher denied employment 
because of membership in a listed organization ‘is not thereby denied the right of free 
speech and assembly. His freedom of choice between membership in the organization 
and employment in the school system may be limited, but not his freedom of speech or 
assembly, except in the remote sense that limitation is inherent in every choice.’
 385 U.S. 589, 605–06 (1967).
42. Id. at 605.
43. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 567–68 (1968) (holding that teachers do not relinquish their 
First Amendment rights to comment on matters of public interest in connection with the operation of 
public schools in which they are employed); see also Richard Hiers, Public Employees’ Free Speech: An 
Endangered Species of First Amendment Rights in Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit Jurisprudence, 
5 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 169, 177 (1993).
44. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564.
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the teacher’s First Amendment freedom of speech rights were violated,45 adding that 
the challenge for a court is to “arrive at a balance between the interests of the [public 
employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the 
interests of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public 
services it performs through its employees.”46 This analysis—balancing the interests 
of the employee commenting upon matters of public concern against the interests of 
the employer promoting the efficiency of its public services—is known as the 
Pickering balancing test.47
 In 1983, the Court enhanced the Pickering balancing test through another 
landmark public employee free speech decision.48 In Connick v. Meyers, the Court 
built on the Pickering balancing test, specifying that before the test can be applied, 
the court must first determine whether the speech can be characterized as a matter 
of public concern.49 The Court then set forth a framework for determining whether 
a public employee’s speech constitutes a matter of public concern.50
 Both Pickering and Connick dealt with a public employee’s speech that was 
written, with its contents undisputed.51 In 1994, however, the Court in Waters v. 
Churchill was faced with the question of whether or not the Pickering balancing test 
applies when the employer is unsure as to the actual content of the employee’s 
speech.52 The Court dissected its previous Pickering and Connick analyses and held 
that the Pickering balancing test, inclusive of Connick’s initial threshold question 
refinement, can be applied to situations when the substance of the employee’s speech 
is unwritten, and therefore, disputed.53
45. Id. at 565. See generally Joseph O. Oluwole, The Pickering Balancing Test and Public Employment-Free 
Speech Jurisprudence: The Approaches of Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals, 46 Duq. L. Rev. 133, 135 (2008); 
Rodric B. Schoen, Pickering Plus Thirty Years: Public Employees and Free Speech, 30 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 
5, 16 (1999); Riley, supra note 4, at 986.
46. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
47. Gillis v. Miller, 845 F.3d 677, 684 (6th Cir. 2017). 
48. Riley, supra note 4, at 901; Schoen, supra note 45, at 16.
49. See Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 146–48 (1938) (outlining that “Pickering, its antecedents and 
progeny, lead us to conclude that if [the speech] cannot be fairly characterized as constituting speech on 
a matter of public concern, it is unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reason for her discharge”).
50. Id. (“Whether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the 
content, form and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record.”).
51. See id. at 141–42 (holding that the contents of the questionnaire the employee distributed were undisputed); 
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564 (finding that the contents of the employee’s letter were undisputed).
52. 511 U.S. 661, 664 (1994) (plurality opinion) (“In this case, we decide whether the [Pickering] test should 
be applied to what the government employer thought was said, or to what the trier of fact ultimately 
determines to have been said.”). In Waters, the employee’s speech was in question because it was part of 
a conversation that was overheard between employees; the speech was not written. Id.
53. Id. at 661 (holding that the Pickering balancing test should be applied to “what the government employer 
reasonably thought was said”).
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 Today, the Pickering balancing test still stands as good law.54 Although the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals applied the Pickering balancing test in Gillis when 
determining whether the Plaintiffs’ speech was constitutionally protected,55 the court 
applied incorrect case law and ignored multiple precedents while applying this test, 
rendering future cases harder to adjudicate.
 In Gillis, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment, holding that the Plaintiffs did not have a valid First Amendment claim 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the Defendants’ interests outweighed the Plaintiffs’ 
interests under the Pickering balancing test.56 The Gillis court reasoned that because 
the Defendants did not need to show evidence that the Plaintiffs’ speech caused 
actual disruption to the workplace, the Defendants should prevail under the Pickering 
balancing test.57 Further, the court held that because the Plaintiffs’ claims failed 
under the Pickering balancing test, it “need not decide whether the . . . memorandum 
touched on matters of public concern.”58 The Plaintiffs argued that the Defendants 
were required to show evidence that the memorandum caused actual disruption to 
the jail’s operations, and because the Defendants failed to do so, the Plaintiffs should 
prevail under the Pickering balancing test.59 The Plaintiffs further contended that the 
memorandum touched on matters of public concern because its aims were to ensure 
the Defendants did not violate the Weingarten rights of other union employees and to 
expose the Defendants’ alleged corruption.60
 This case presented two specific issues before the Sixth Circuit in the application 
of the Pickering balancing test: first, whether the employees’ speech constituted a 
matter of public concern and second, whether actual evidence of disruption in the 
workplace must be shown by the employer when weighing its interests in promoting 
efficiency.61 The Gillis court erred in affirming the district court’s grant of the 
Defendants’ summary judgment motion because the court made two errors when 
applying the Pickering balancing test. First, the court failed to address the threshold 
question of public concern before applying the test. As per Connick, the speech must 
first be reviewed to determine whether it touches upon a matter of public concern, 
and only if so should the court then apply the Pickering balancing test.62 Second, the 
court erred because it incorrectly applied the precedent set out in Waters. The court 
54. 5 Emp. Coord. Employment Practices § 1:25.50 (Nov. 2019 update).
55. Gillis v. Miller, 845 F.3d 677, 683–85 (6th Cir. 2017).
56. Id. at 690.
57. Id. at 687–88.
58. Id. at 690.
59. Id. at 688 –90.
60. Id. at 689–90.
61. See generally id. at 684–86.
62. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983).
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failed to recognize that the material facts in Gillis were distinguishable from those in 
Waters—the speech in Waters was disputed whereas the speech in Gillis was not.63
 First, the Gillis court failed to address the threshold question of public concern 
before applying the Pickering balancing test. Adhering to the doctrines of vertical 
and horizontal stare decisis, the court should have first addressed the threshold 
question of whether the employees’ speech is a matter of public concern, and only if 
so, then applied the Pickering balancing test.64 In Rankin, relying on Connick, the 
Court explicitly stated that “the threshold question in applying [the Pickering] 
balancing test is whether [the employee’s] speech may be ‘fairly characterized as 
constituting speech on a matter of public concern.’”65 The Court upheld this threshold 
question requirement in Waters,66 Garcetti,67 and Lane68—all cases that called for 
application of the Pickering balancing test.69 In Whitney v. City of Milan, a case that 
preceded Gillis by nearly five years, the Sixth Circuit properly adhered to the doctrine 
of vertical stare decisis because it held that first, a court should evaluate whether the 
employee’s speech touches on a matter of public concern and, if so, to apply the 
Pickering balancing test.70 Addressing the threshold question before applying the 
Pickering balancing test is crucial to the analysis because determining if the speech is 
63. See Gillis, 845 F.3d at 688 (finding that the speech in question was a written memorandum).
64. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) (“The first [inquiry] requires determining whether 
the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern. If the answer is no, the employee has no 
First Amendment cause of action.”); Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 611, 668 (1994) (plurality opinion) 
(stating “[t]o be protected, the speech must be on a matter of public concern”); Connick, 461 U.S. at 
147–48 (“Whether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by 
the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record.”); Farhat v. Jopke, 
370 F.3d 580, 588–89 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 143; Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 
U.S. 563, 568–88 (1968)).
65. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987).
66. See Waters, 511 U.S. at 668 (plurality opinion) (“To be protected, the speech must be on a matter of 
public concern.”).
67. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418. Two inquiries must be made under the Pickering balancing test: “The first 
[inquiry] requires determining whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern. If 
the answer is no, the employee has no First Amendment cause of action.” Id.
68. See Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 237 (2014) (discussing the two-step inquiry outlined in Garcetti).
69. See Lane, 573 U.S. at 235–37 (discussing how the Pickering balancing test provides the framework for 
analyzing the issue in question); Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 417–18 (outlining the Pickering balancing test and 
how it applies to the speech in question); Waters, 511 U.S. at 668 (plurality opinion) (stating that the 
dispute is over how to apply the Pickering balancing test).
70. 677 F.3d 292, 296 (6th Cir. 2012). The court stated:
First, we determine whether the affected speech involved a public employee’s comments 
as a private citizen on a matter of public concern. Second, if the speech involves a 
matter of public concern, then we must balance the interests of the public employee, ‘as 
a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, 
as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through 
its employees.’
 Id. See also Farhat v. Jopke, 370 F.3d 580, 588–89 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 
138, 143 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568–88 (1968)).
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a matter of public concern is the crux of whether the employee has a claim under the 
First Amendment.71 Moreover, the language of the Pickering balancing test itself 
supports the Court’s holding that the threshold question of public concern must first 
be addressed, stating that a court must “arrive at a balance between the interests of 
the [public employee], as a citizen, in commenting about matters of public concern.”72 
The court can only conduct the balancing of interests once it has established that the 
employee’s speech touched upon matters of public concern—which are balanced 
against the government’s interests as an employer.73
 The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Gillis—to omit the analysis of the initial threshold 
question before applying the Pickering balancing test—flies squarely against the 
doctrines of vertical and horizontal stare decisis. The court blatantly deviated from 
not only Supreme Court precedent,74 but also its own precedent75 and thus, failed to 
adhere to the doctrines of vertical and horizontal stare decisis. Had the Gillis court 
properly adhered to the doctrines of vertical and horizontal stare decisis, it would 
have first answered the threshold question of whether the employees’ speech was a 
matter of public concern and only then applied the Pickering balancing test. The 
Sixth Circuit’s failure to adhere to vertical and horizontal stare decisis causes 
instability and unpredictability in the law.76
 Second, the court erred in its administration of the Pickering balancing test by 
incorrectly applying the Waters precedent, thereby ignoring the correct and applicable 
precedent under vertical stare decisis. These errors caused the court to incorrectly 
hold that employers need not show evidence that the employee’s speech caused actual 
disruption to the workplace to prevail under the Pickering balancing test. The 
requirement that employers produce evidence of actual disruption was a matter of 
first impression for the Sixth Circuit—a matter of first impression that the court 
71. See Lane, 573 U.S. at 233 (“Speech by citizens of public concern lies at the heart of the First 
Amendment.”); Waters, 511 U.S. at 668 (plurality opinion) (explaining that to be protected, “the speech 
must be on a matter of public concern”); Connick, 461 U.S. at 145 (“[T]he Court has frequently 
reaffirmed that speech on public issues occupies the ‘highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment 
Values,’ and is entitled to special protection.”).
72. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 
73. Id.
74. See Lane, 573 U.S. at 237 (citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418); Waters, 511 U.S. at 668 (plurality opinion) 
(stating “[t]o be protected, the speech must be on a matter of public concern”).
75. Whitney v. City of Milan, 677 F.3d 292, 297–98 (6th Cir. 2012) (outlining that the first step is to 
determine whether the speech involved a matter of public concern).
76. See Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court 
Decisionmaking, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 38–41 (1994) (explaining how individuals rely on legal rules when 
they are putting their affairs in order and the effects of instability and unpredictability in the law); 
Randy Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 411, 418 (2010) (“When the 
Court settles a dispute in a certain way, it is natural that people and institutions affected by the dispute 
will rely on the Court’s decision in shaping their understandings and behaviors.”); Joseph W. Mead, 
Stare Decisis in the Inferior Courts of the United States, 12 Nev. L.J. 787, 792–93 (2012) (explaining how 
instability arises when courts fail to adhere to stare decisis since “[s]table law enables the public to know 
and understand what their civic rights and duties are”).
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incorrectly decided.77 The court should have limited its application of Waters due to 
its unique utilization of the Pickering balancing test and adhered to the doctrine of 
vertical stare decisis that requires employers show evidence that the employee’s 
speech caused actual disruption to the workplace.
 In Waters, the content of the employee’s speech was in dispute78 and the Court’s 
holding and analysis centered around this issue.79 Cheryl Churchill, a nurse at a 
public hospital, had a conversation with one of her colleagues while on dinner break.80 
This conversation was overheard by three other hospital employees who notified 
Churchill’s supervisor.81 Churchill was terminated from her job because of alleged 
negative statements she made during the conversation, specifically, about her 
supervisor and department.82 However, Churchill’s recollection of the conversation 
was different—she denied saying some of the statements the hospital employees 
alleged she said.83 The court noted that while there was no dispute as to a conversation 
taking place—the speech—there was a dispute as to what was actually said during 
the conversation—the content of the speech.84
 Churchill argued she was terminated because of these statements and thus, her 
First Amendment rights were violated.85 The issue the Court was faced with was 
how to apply the Pickering balancing test—whether to apply it to the speech as the 
government employer found it to be or to have a jury determine the facts of the 
77. Gillis v. Miller, 845 F.3d 677, 685 (6th Cir. 2017).
78. Waters, 511 U.S. at 664 (plurality opinion). The speech that the Pickering balancing test was applied to 
in Waters differs from the speech in the actual Pickering case because the content of the defendant’s 
speech in Waters was in dispute. Compare id. (acknowledging that there was a “dispute about what 
Churchill actually said”), with Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564 (finding that the employee sent a letter whose 
contents are undisputed).
79. See Waters, 511 U.S. at 668 (plurality opinion) (stating the dispute in the case is to determine how to 
apply the Pickering test when the speech is in question—whether the court should apply the test to the 
government’s assessments of the content of the speech, or should ask the jury to determine the facts); see 
also Mark Strasser, Pickering, Garcetti, & Academic Freedom, 83 Brook. L. Rev. 579, 589–91 (2018) 
(explaining that the contents of Churchill’s speech were in dispute and how the Waters Court applied 
the Pickering balancing test); Riley, supra note 4, at 905–06; Schoen, supra note 45, at 37–38 (explaining 
that in Waters, the Court was faced with applying the Pickering balancing test to a mistake of fact).
80. Waters, 511 U.S. at 664. 
81. Id. at 665.
82. Id. at 661. Churchill allegedly made “disruptive statements critical of her department and supervisors.” 
Id.
83. Id. at 665. During the conversation, Churchill allegedly was “knocking the [obstetrics] department” 
stating that it was a “bad place” to work. Id. According to Churchill, the conversation was about her 
concerns regarding the hospital’s cross-training policy under which nurses from one department could 
work in another if their usual location was overstaffed. Id. Churchill admitted to having made negative 
statements during the conversation, but argued that those comments were all centered around her 
concerns that the cross-training policy threatened patient care. Id.
84. See id. at 664.
85. Id. at 668.
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speech itself.86 The Court held that the Pickering balancing test should be applied to 
what the government employer reasonably thought was said, finding that because the 
contents of the speech in question were disputed, greater deference should be given 
to a government employer’s predictions of harm. Thus, employers need not present 
evidence of actual disruption to the workplace.87 Relying on the Court’s analysis in 
Waters, the Second,88 Third,89 Seventh,90 Eighth,91 Ninth,92 and Eleventh93 Circuits 
have held that employers need not present evidence of actual disruption to prevail 
under the Pickering balancing test.94 Unlike in Waters, the speech in Connick and 
Rankin95 was undisputed. Thus, the Supreme Court maintained that in order for the 
government to prevail under the Pickering balancing test, it must show evidence that 
the employee’s speech impacted the actual operation of the government.96 The Tenth 
Circuit followed suit in Melton v. City of Oklahoma City, Schalk v. Gallemore, and 
Barker v. City of Del City, holding that the government, as an employer, must 
introduce evidence of an actual disruption to its services resulting from the employee’s 
speech.97 In all three Tenth Circuit cases, as in United States v. National Treasury 
86. Id.
87. Id. at 661, 673.
88. Lewis v. Cowen, 165 F.3d 154, 163 (2d Cir. 1999) (“The state need show only a ‘likely interference’ with 
its operations, and ‘not an actual disruption.’”).
89. Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 472 (3d Cir. 2015) (“The government need not show 
the existence of actual disruption if it established that disruption is likely to occur because of the 
speech.”).
90. Wallace v. Benware, 67 F.3d 655, 661 n.8 (7th Cir. 1995) (“We do not agree, however, that an actual 
disruption of the affected department need to be shown[.]”). 
91. Tindle v. Caudell, 56 F.3d 966, 972 (8th Cir. 1995) (“A showing of actual disruption is not always 
required in the balancing process under Pickering.”). 
92. Brewster v. Bd. of Educ., 149 F.3d 971, 979 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[P]ublic employers need not allege that an 
employee’s expression actually disrupted the workplace; ‘reasonable predictions of disruption’ are 
sufficient.”).
93. Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1108 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (holding that “a particularized 
showing of interference with the provision of public services is not required” under Waters).
94. Munroe, 805 F.3d at 472; Lewis v. Cowen, 165 F.3d 154, 163 (2d Cir. 1999); Brewster, 149 F.3d at 979; 
Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1108; Tindle, 56 F.3d at 972; Wallace, 67 F.3d at 661 n.8. See also Gillis v. Miller, 845 
F.3d 677, 687 (6th Cir. 2017) (acknowledging the Waters plurality and holding that a “public employer 
need not show actual disruption of the public agency in all cases in order to prevail under the Pickering 
balancing test.”).
95. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 381–82 (1987) (citing McPherson’s testimony and 
uncontroverted evidence that she made the statement in question); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 141 
(1983) (establishing Myers’ creation and distribution of the questionnaire for which she was fired).
96. See Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388–89; Connick, 461 U.S. at 166.
97. See Barker v. City of Del City, 215 F.3d 1134, 1140 (10th Cir. 2000) (“No actual evidence indicates that 
the [employer] experienced any disruption.”); Schalk v. Gallemore, 906 F.2d 491, 496 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(quoting Melton v. City of Okla. City, 879 F.2d 706, 715–16. (10th Cir. 1989) (“The government must 
produce evidence of an actual disruption of services which results from the employee’s speech.”)).
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Employees Union, Connick, and Rankin, the speech in question was undisputed 
because it was written and could be referenced for analysis.98
 The Gillis court based its decision on Waters stating: “We therefore join those 
courts and the Waters plurality and hold that a public employer need not show actual 
disruption of the public agency in all cases in order to prevail under the Pickering 
balancing test.”99 However, this holding is incorrect.100 The Gillis court erred in its 
application of Waters because Waters applies the Pickering balancing test to a unique 
and distinguishable set of facts—situations when the speech in question is unwritten 
and thus disputed.101 The Supreme Court departed from its own precedent when 
deciding Waters because it was faced with the application of the Pickering balancing 
test to a new and unusual set of facts.102 The Gillis court directly quotes the Waters 
Court in its discussion of the deference given to government employers when 
predicting the disputed speech’s harm on the efficiency of the workplace.103 However, 
the Sixth Circuit applied this discussion to Gillis incorrectly because the deference the 
Court was referring to was for instances when the actual content of the employee’s 
speech is disputed—situations in which the speech is not written and cannot be 
referenced for analysis.104 This was not the case in Gillis, as the speech in question was 
a written memorandum. The Gillis court’s failure to recognize the difference between 
these material facts resulted in an incorrect holding and thus, f lawed precedent.105
 The Gillis court should have adhered to vertical stare decisis from National 
Treasury Employees Union, Connick, and Rankin, and followed the Tenth Circuit 
because the material facts in these cases are analogous to Gillis—the speech at issue 
98. See e.g., United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emp. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 461–62 (1995) (explaining the 
speech in question was written); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 381–82 (1987) (citing McPherson’s 
testimony and uncontroverted evidence that she made the statement in question); Connick v. Myers, 
461 U.S. 138, 141 (1983) (establishing Myers’ creation and distribution of a written questionnaire for 
which she was fired); Barker, 215 F.3d at 1137 (explaining that the speech in question was not in 
dispute); Schalk, 906 F.2d at 492 (outlining the speech in question was not disputed by the court because 
it was a written letter); Melton, 879 F.2d at 715–16 (outlining the speech between counsel and Melton 
was undisputed).
99. Gillis, 845 F.3d at 687.
100. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 668 (1994) (plurality opinion) (stating the dispute in the case is to 
determine how to apply the Pickering test when the speech is in question—whether the court should apply 
the test to the speech as the government found it to be or to ask a jury to determine the facts for itself).
101. See id.
102. See Riley, supra note 4, at 913.
103. Gillis, 845 F.3d at 687. See also Waters, 511 U.S. at 676 (plurality opinion) (discussing deference given to 
the alleged speech and reasoning that “employers, public and private, often do rely on hearsay, on past 
similar conduct, on their personal knowledge of people’s credibility… [s]uch reliance may sometimes be 
the most effective way for the employer to avoid future recurrences of improper and disruptive conduct”).
104. See Waters, 511 U.S. at 676 (plurality opinion).
105. See Gillis, 845 F.3d at 681–82 (discussing the creation and posting of the memorandum titled 
“Weingarten Rights” in response to complaints received by Gillis and Walraven).
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was undisputed.106 Had the court applied this proper precedent, it would have held 
that employers must show actual evidence that the employee’s speech caused 
disruption in the workplace.107 Applying the correct precedent could have drastically 
changed the outcome for the Plaintiffs because had the Defendants been required to 
provide evidence that the memorandum disrupted the workplace and failed to do so, 
the court would likely have ruled in favor of the Plaintiffs.
 Stare decisis mandates that “a court must follow earlier judicial decisions when 
the same points arise again in litigation.”108 The same points in Waters did not arise 
in Gillis—the speech was oral and disputed in the former, and written and undisputed 
in the latter.109 Failure of courts to adhere to stare decisis causes instability and 
unpredictability in the law.110 By applying incorrect precedent, the Gillis court caused 
unpredictability as to whether an employer is required to present evidence of 
disruption to the workplace in order to prevail under the Pickering balancing test. 
This unpredictability directly impacts employees’ behavior, as well as whether they 
can assert First Amendment claims that call for the Pickering balancing test.111
 The doctrines of vertical and horizontal stare decisis promote fairness, stability, 
predictability, efficiency, and thus, foster the public’s confidence in the law.112 Federal 
courts have been upholding the doctrine of stare decisis since the nation’s founding 
in order to promote these factors.113 Under the doctrine of stare decisis, a court must 
follow earlier judicial decisions from its own jurisdiction, or a higher one, when the 
106. See id. at 681–83 (explaining the background and context to which the letter was written). See also 
United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emp. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 461–62 (1995) (explaining the speech in 
question was written by individuals within the class of employees alleging infringement of freedom of 
speech by honorarium ban); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 381–82 (1987) (citing McPherson’s 
testimony and uncontroverted evidence that she made the statement in question); Connick v. Myers, 
461 U.S. 138, 141 (1983) (establishing Myers’ creation and distribution of the questionnaire for which 
she was fired).
107. See, e.g., Rankin, 483 U.S. at 379 (holding the employer did not meet its burden to demonstrate that its 
interest outweighed the employee’s interest in commenting upon matters of public concern because no 
evidence was presented that such comments interfered with the efficient functioning of the office); 
Barker v. City of Del City, 215 F.3d 1134, 1134 (10th Cir. 2000) (“No actual evidence indicates that the 
[employer] experienced any disruption.”); Schalk v. Gallemore, 906 F.2d 491, 496 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(quoting Melton v. City of Okla. City, 879 F.2d 706, 739 (10th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he government must 
produce evidence of an actual disruption of services which results from the employee’s speech.”)). 
108. Stare decisis, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
109. Compare Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 661 (1994) (plurality opinion) (stating “[w]hat Churchill 
actually said during the conversation is in dispute”), with Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564 
(1968) (finding that the employee sent a letter whose contents are undisputed).
110. See Mead, supra note 76, at 792–93 (explaining how unpredictability and instability in the law arise 
when courts fail to adhere to stare decisis).
111. See id. at 793; Kozel, supra note 76, at 418.
112. See James C. Rehnquist, The Power That Shall Be Vested in a Precedent: Stare Decisis, The Constitution and 
the Supreme Court, 66 B.U. L. Rev. 345, 347 (1986).
113. See Mead, supra note 76, at 792.
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same issues arise in litigation.114 When a court strays from stare decisis, fairness, 
stability, predictability, and efficiency are threatened because inconsistent application 
of the law violates the central premise of the U.S. legal system—that similar litigants 
be treated equally.115 This premise ensures that legal decisions are grounded in 
objective principles, such as previous applications of the law, rather than subjective 
principles, like biases of individual judges.116 Predictability is critical because it 
impacts human interactions on every level—it encourages individuals to engage in 
socially desirable conduct and abstain from undesirable conduct.117 By knowing the 
rules in advance, individuals are able to adjust their behaviors and thus, laws are 
socially productive.118 But in order for laws to be productive, predictability must be 
fostered through adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis.119
 In summary, the Gillis court erred when applying the Pickering balancing test. 
First, it failed to address the threshold question of public concern and second, it held 
that employers need not present actual evidence of disruption to the workplace caused 
by the employee’s speech. Each of these errors stemmed from the court’s inadequate 
adherence to the doctrines of vertical and horizontal stare decisis. The court neglected 
both forms of stare decisis when applying the Pickering balancing test by failing to 
first determine whether the speech was a matter of public concern. Further, the court 
failed to apply proper vertical stare decisis by mistakenly analogizing Waters, in 
which the Pickering balancing test was applied to disputed speech, to Gillis, in which 
the speech was undisputed. The court’s failure to adhere to proper precedent has 
promoted instability, inconsistency, and unpredictability, and thus, has muddied the 
waters for future cases that must apply the Pickering balancing test and for individuals 
making decisions in the employer-employee context.120
114. Stare decisis, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
115. Mead, supra note 76, at 793.
116. Caminker, supra note 76, at 65.
117. Id. at 38. See also Mead, supra note 76, at 793.
118. Caminker, supra note 76, at 38.
119. Id.
120. See Caminker, supra note 76, at 38–41; Kozel, supra note 76, at 418; Mead, supra note 76, at 792–93.
